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Abstract: This article seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the changing legal 
landscape of marriage and civil partnership law in Northern Ireland. It looks at three specific 
areas: first, marriage law pursuant to the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003; second, the 
Northern Irish context of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 coupled with the ongoing debate 
over Northern Ireland’s failure to introduce same sex marriage; and third, the absence of any 
facility for belief/humanist weddings that has only very recently been resolved. It is argued 
that the influence of Northern Irish religious beliefs and culture has resulted, overall, in a 
legal landscape that is out of step with the rest of the United Kingdom, most notably in its 
refusal to introduce same sex marriage. Paradoxically, however, the authors conclude that in 
other respects the law of England and Wales remains antiquated in comparison with that of 
Northern Ireland, where marriage law has been radically reformed in the last 15 years. 
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Introduction1 
When the Royal Commission reported in 1868 on the marriage law of pre-Partition Ireland,2 
marriage by the Church of Ireland (the Established Church at that time) differed little from 
marriage law in England and Wales.3 However, with respect to marriages other than those by 
                                                 
1 We should like to thank Professor Rebecca Probert and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and thought-
provoking comments on various drafts of this article. 
2 Report of the Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage: with an appendix (HMSO, 1868) x. 
3 The Church of Ireland was disestablished by the Irish Church Act 1869, a year after the report was published. 
See further R Probert, M Harding and B Dempsey, ‘A Uniform Law Of Marriage? The 1868 Royal Commission 
Reconsidered’ [2018] 30 CFLQ **. 
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the Church of Ireland there was considerable divergence between the laws of these two parts 
of the United Kingdom. As the Royal Commission explained, the marriage law of Ireland 
was sectarian and denominational, ‘varying in the substance of its provisions according to 
differences of religious belief, to a much greater extent than the law of England’.4 
This complex history is partly why the development of marriage and civil partnership 
law in Northern Ireland is so fascinating. Indeed, the jurisdiction’s unique political and 
historical context and dominant social conservativism have both shaped reform and obstructed 
it.5 Though almost all the core legislation for Northern Ireland has been passed not by the 
Northern Ireland Assembly6 but by the Westminster Parliament, the influence of Northern Irish 
beliefs and culture have brought it out of step with the rest of the UK, most notably in its refusal 
to introduce same sex marriage. Yet in some respects, the law in England and Wales lags 
behind that of Northern Ireland; the former relies on an antiquated system of marriage law 
while Northern Ireland’s marriage law has been subject to wholesale reform in the last 15 years.  
The first part of this article will explore why and how marriage law was reformed under 
the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (SI 2003/413), referred to subsequently as the 
2003 Order. It will be argued that the historical context of marriage in Northern Ireland both 
before and after Partition culminated in a legislative mess, whereby procedure affecting the 
registration of marriages differed (sometimes significantly) depending on the religion of the 
parties. This created a law that was in urgent need of reform and, under the 2003 Order, 
                                                 
4 Report of the Royal Commission xii. 
5 It should be noted, however, that the focus of this article is on legal change in Northern Ireland, and so does 
not comprehensively detail the development of changing approaches to marriage and civil partnership by the 
political parties in this jurisdiction. A full exploration of the social and political landscape in Northern Ireland is 
outside the scope of this article. For more information see: P Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and 
Peace (Palgrave 2008). 
6 The Assembly established as a result of the Belfast Agreement, also known as the Good Friday Agreement, 
which first met on 1 July 1998. It is not to be confused with the earlier Northern Ireland Assembly established 
under the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 and which collapsed in 1974. In the course of the negotiations 
leading up to the Belfast Agreement, Seamus Mallon MP famously – and accurately – predicted that whatever 
emerged at the end of the talks would be ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’. 
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Northern Ireland adopted a model like that in Scotland, replacing registration of buildings for 
the solemnization of marriage with a register of religious officiants. 
The second part will examine same sex relationships in Northern Ireland: specifically, 
the Northern Irish context of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the ongoing debate over 
Northern Ireland’s failure to introduce same sex marriage. The 2004 Act divided opinion 
between the two communities and political discord over same sex marriage has deepened those 
battle-lines; however, in spite of public pressure north and south of the border and numerous 
challenges in the Northern Ireland courts, reform has not yet happened. 
Finally, the third part of this article will focus on humanist weddings. Northern 
Ireland’s cultural proximity to the Republic of Ireland and the strong institutional and 
interpersonal links between the two jurisdictions have meant that the absence of any facility 
for humanist weddings has caused some controversy, culminating in the recent decision by the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in Smyth, Re Judicial Review.7 
By tracing the history of marriage and civil partnership, we argue that Northern Ireland 
is currently at a critical juncture. While commentators rightly point out that Northern Ireland’s 
resistance to change is caused by the ‘prevailing social conservatism and dominance of religion 
in social life’8 in the jurisdiction, there are signs that the influence of such conservativism is 
waning. Indeed, by applying a historical lens to marriage and civil partnership in Northern 
Ireland, and by comparing debates surrounding civil partnership with debates on same sex 
marriage today, it is clear that social attitudes even in a historically conservative jurisdiction 
can, and do, change.  
 
                                                 
7 Smyth, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 55, [2018] NICA 25. 
8 Office of Law Reform, Department of Finance and Personnel, ‘Civil Partnership: A Legal Status for 
Committed Same-Sex Couples in Northern Ireland: Analysis of Responses’ (Northern Ireland Office, 2004) at 
[3.2]. See also B Sloan, ‘Registered Partnerships in Northern Ireland’ in Scherpe and Hayward (eds), The Future 
of Registered Partnerships (Intersentia, 2017). 
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Before and after the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 
Marriage and family law in Northern Ireland generally are ‘transferred matters’ within the 
legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly,9 inasmuch as they do not appear in 
the list of ‘excepted matters’ specified in Schedule 2 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 or of 
‘reserved matters’ specified in Schedule 3. As we shall see, however, almost all the core 
legislation for Northern Ireland has been passed not by the Assembly but by the Westminster 
Parliament, either as part of a UK-wide statute or because the Assembly was suspended at the 
material time.10 The law relating to marriage in the jurisdiction therefore has a complex 
history11 which cannot be explained without giving some attention to the state of the law at the 
Partition of Ireland in 1921.12 
 
Marriage law in 1921 
At the time of Partition there were three distinct classes of non-Anglican ceremonies: Roman 
Catholic marriages, Presbyterian marriages and marriages under a registrar’s certificate or 
licence. The Royal Commission had noted that the House of Lords had held in R v Millis13 that 
the presence of an Anglican or Roman Catholic cleric at the time of solemnization was  
‘essential to the valid constitution of the contract of marriage: but a marriage solemnized by 
any such clergyman, whether publicly or privately, at whatever time or place, and in whatever 
                                                 
9 The Westminster Parliament will not normally legislate on a ‘transferred matter’ without the consent of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly. 
10 For example, the Polygamous Marriages (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (SI 3211/1995), which provides that a 
potentially polygamous marriage entered into outside Northern Ireland by parties neither of whom was already 
married should not be void on the ground that either party was domiciled in Northern Ireland, was enacted at 
Westminster. 
11 See Sloan, n 8 above, and S Semple, ‘Researching the Law of Northern Ireland’ (2008) 8 Legal Information 
Management 283. 
12 Northern Ireland was created pursuant to the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the Partition took effect in 
1921. For a comprehensive overview of the law in Northern Ireland, see B Dickson, Law in Northern Ireland 
(Hart Publishing, 3rd edn, 2018). 
13 R v Millis [1843-44] 10 Clark and Finnelly 534, 8 ER 844. Interestingly, at 8 ER 849 their Lordships quoted 
Lyndwood’s Provinciale (published by Wynkyn de Worde in 1496) as authority for the proposition that 
marriage should only be celebrated in public: ‘nisi in loco celebri coram publicis et pluribus personis ad hoc 
convocatis’. 
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form or manner, (between parties competent to intermarry), was valid, without any previous 
publication of banns, licence, notice, residence, or consent’ and that it was still the law of 
Ireland in relation to Roman Catholic marriages. It remained so after 1921. 
As to Presbyterian marriages, the Marriages (Ireland) Act 1844 that had been passed in 
consequence of the decision in R v Millis distinguished between Presbyterians and other 
Nonconformist denominations and established a procedure for Presbyterian marriages closely 
resembling that for the Church of Ireland: marriage might be solemnized in a certified 
Presbyterian meeting house by a Presbyterian minister according to the Presbyterian Church’s 
forms. Such a marriage either had to be preceded by publication of banns or be conducted under 
licence ‘granted by certain Presbyterian ministers whose function closely resembles that of 
surrogates in the Established Church’.14 If both parties were Presbyterians they could choose 
between banns or licence; otherwise, a licence was necessary. 
As to other religious marriages, clergy of denominations other than the Church of 
Ireland, the Roman Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Churches could solemnize and 
register marriages on receipt of an authority from a civil registrar15 and there were special 
provisions for marriages of Quakers and Jews. In short, the legal procedure applicable to 
marriage depended on the faith of the couple getting married. Not only were such legal 
formalities distinct within Ireland, the law relating to faiths other than the Church of Ireland 
also differed significantly from marriage law in England and Wales.16  
Moreover, the ‘extensive divergence’ noted by the Royal Commission in 1868 persisted 
long after Partition in 1921: the Marriage Act 1949 consolidated the law of England and Wales 
                                                 
14Report of the Royal Commission xiii. A surrogate is a cleric of the Church of England or the Church in Wales 
(or, in the days of R v Millis, of the Church of Ireland) deputed by the Chancellor of the diocese to receive 
applications for the grant of a Bishop’s common licence to authorise a marriage. 
15 Law Reform Advisory Committee, Marriage Law - Report No 11 (LRAC No 9, 2000) [1.28(c)]. 
16 For a comprehensive overview of marriage law in England and Wales, see R Probert, ‘A Uniform Marriage 
Law for England and Wales’ [2018] 30 CFLQ ***. 
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– with very minor amendments17 – but left marriage law in Northern Ireland untouched, so that 
by the time wholesale reform was considered, the law had changed relatively little since the 
nineteenth century. Put simply, Northern Ireland inherited a mesh of divergent marriage law 
that had been introduced ad hoc across a chaotic period of Irish history and depended on the 
faith of the parties and the church in which the marriage was solemnized. As the Minister of 
Finance and Personnel later summarised the position: 
The current law stems from a series of statutes dating back to the early Victorian era. The 
system of marriage preliminaries has not developed on a uniform basis and privileges in relation 
to the celebration, timing and place of actual marriage are granted to certain religious groups 
and not to others. The current rules relating to religious and civil marriage venues are 
unnecessarily complex and unsatisfactory, and certain churches are afforded greater autonomy 
than others that are subject to a larger amount of state control. In addition, the current rules in 
relation to notice of intended marriage and preliminary notification requirements are too 
complex and those relating to the registration of marriages are also felt to be in need of 
wholesale change.18 
The Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 
Unsurprisingly, this was problematic in practice; and in 1998, the then Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, referred the law relating to marriage preliminaries to the Law 
Reform Advisory Committee for Northern Ireland19 because she considered that the existing 
law was ‘outdated, …possibly discriminatory’ and needed to be simplified.20 
                                                 
17 The Marriage Act 1949 was ‘An Act to consolidate certain enactments relating to the solemnization and 
registration of marriages in England with such corrections and improvements as may be authorised under the 
Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949’. 
18 Department of Finance and Personnel, Marriage Bill: Explanatory and Financial Memorandum (2002), at 
<http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/legislation/primary/2001/niabill18_01-efm.htm> accessed 2 January 2018, 
para 5. 
19 The Advisory Committee was the precursor to the Northern Ireland Law Commission, which was established 
in 2007 following the recommendations of the Criminal Justice Review Group. 
20 Hansard, HC First Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, col 3 (16 December 2002). 
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The Committee reported to the Northern Ireland Assembly in December 200021 and its 
recommendations formed the basis of a Marriage Bill22 introduced into the Assembly. The 
Committee’s recommendations merit some consideration because, although the Marriage Bill 
did not become law, its contents provided the basis for the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 
2003, which is the statutory source of marriage law in Northern Ireland today. As a result, this 
section will consider how and why marriage law in Northern Ireland was reformed by first 
outlining the key recommendations of the Law Reform Advisory Committee, tracing the 
journey of the Marriage Bill and finally outlining the circumstances in which the 2003 Order 
was introduced. 
For the Law Reform Advisory Committee, issues of equality came first when 
considering legislative reform. In its ‘guiding principles for reform’ it stated that equal and fair 
treatment was of particular importance in the Northern Ireland context,23 given sectarian 
tensions in that jurisdiction, which had to be considered alongside any reform relevant to 
religious belief. Accordingly, the Committee emphasised that ‘any new legislation must be 
framed so far as possible to ensure common rights and duties irrespective of religious 
affiliation’. At the heart of the Committee’s recommendations, therefore, was a desire to 
produce a system of marriage law that could be universally applicable and effective.  
As a result, it was clear that applying the Committee’s approach rendered the existing 
law unfit for purpose because its differential treatment according to religion (with regard to 
venues, preliminary procedural requirements, authorisation of celebrants, registration 
requirements and hours and forms of marriage) could not be objectively justified and was 
therefore possibly discriminatory. On that basis, the Committee made 32 recommendations for 
legislative reform. For instance, a new system, according to the Committee should, so far as 
                                                 
21 Law Reform Advisory Committee, n 15 above. 
22 NIA Bill 18/01. 
23 Law Reform Advisory Committee, n 15 above. 
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possible, guarantee the continued validity of both religious and civil marriages, should treat all 
religions equally with minimal interference with the existing freedoms of individual religions, 
should ensure equal treatment between those wishing to have a civil or a religious marriage, 
should provide certainty, simplicity, transparency and ease of application and should be cost-
effective.24 
The Committee considered options for reform by looking elsewhere and favoured the 
Scottish model as the best template25 in three principal respects. First, it recommended a 
modified version of the Scottish marriage schedule, which would replace the rules on notice of 
intended marriage and preliminary notification requirements with a unified and simplified 
system of preliminary notification and authorisation. Secondly, the Committee proposed that, 
like the Scottish model, there should be a statutory scheme defining authorised officiants and 
statutory requirements in respect of religious and civil marriage ceremonies. Thirdly, it 
concluded that the current rules on registration of marriages were unnecessarily complicated 
and should be replaced by a simplified system of registration along Scottish lines.26 It also 
recommended that religious marriage venue requirements should be abolished and that the law 
relating to civil marriage venues should be relaxed to follow current English, rather than Scots, 
law. 
The vast majority of the Law Reform Advisory Committee's 32 recommendations were 
incorporated into the Marriage Bill. As a result, the Marriage Bill was closely modelled on 
Scots law, with some exceptions. For example, the Department of Finance and Personnel27 
decided that the Committee’s recommendation on religious officiants could create inequality 
                                                 
24 Law Reform Advisory Committee, n 15 above, (iv)-(v). Specifically, the Committee recommended that the 
law relating to the consequences of procedural irregularity should be clarified and that the current law on 
criminal offences in the Marriage Acts required major simplification. 
25As the explanatory notes of the Marriage Bill stated: ‘The Committee consulted closely with relevant parties in 
Scotland and the framework for reform is based on that jurisdiction, while taking into account local issues and 
variances’: Department of Finance and Personnel, n 18 above. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Which, at the time, oversaw marriage law in Northern Ireland. 
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in relation to different religions because it followed the Scottish system that differentiated 
between larger bodies and smaller organisations. Instead, the Department decided that all 
religious organisations should be treated in the same manner irrespective of size. Furthermore, 
though the Committee had recommended ‘that the law should not prescribe the locations at 
which religious marriages may be conducted and that it should be left to religious bodies 
themselves to determine appropriate venues’28 and relaxing the law relating to civil marriage 
venues, the Department decided instead to legislate in accordance with recent changes to the 
Scots law on approved places for marriage, which were broader in scope.29 The Marriage Bill 
was introduced into the Assembly on 17 June 2002 by the Minister of Finance and Personnel. 
The explanatory notes stated that ‘at the fulcrum of the Bill is the concept of equality’30 and 
that the ‘wholesale change’31 which it sought to introduce was based on removing legal 
differences between religions in Northern Ireland.  
The Bill passed the second stage on 25 June with broad cross-party and cross-
community support and proceeded to committee stage. It was expected that the plenary would 
pass the Bill without further substantive change; however, the Assembly was suspended on 14 
October 2002 and the Bill fell. Instead, its contents provided the basis for the Marriage 
(Northern Ireland) Order 2003 passed by the Westminster Parliament. 
The Explanatory Note to the 2003 Order states – laconically – that ‘This Order makes 
provision in connection with the formalities for marriage and the solemnization and registration 
of marriages’. Which it most certainly did: the Order repealed almost all of the previous law 
on the formation of marriage and instituted an entirely new regime. Its main features were a 
new system of universal civil preliminaries to be used for all marriages, replacing the previous 
procedures which applied in different ways to different denominations and religions, and a 
                                                 
28 Law Reform Advisory Committee, n 15 above, para 5.7. 
29 Department of Finance and Personnel, n 18 above, [14]. 
30 Ibid, [7]. 
31 Ibid, [5]. 
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relaxation of the law on civil marriage venues in order to allow people to marry in a greater 
variety of locations, subject to the approval of the venue by the local authority. The Order 
distinguished between civil and religious marriages and, crucially in relation to the latter, it 
abolished registration of buildings for the solemnization of marriage and replaced it with a 
register of religious officiants. It was not possible to include a definition of marriage in the 
Order, as proposed during the earlier Bill’s committee stage in the Assembly,32 because to do 
so would have been outside its scope; however, as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland pointed out when introducing the draft Order in the Delegated Legislation 
Committee, ‘the definition of marriage is already well settled in common law’.33 
In short, Northern Ireland adopted something very like the Scottish model34 except that, 
though the minimum age for marriage is 16, persons under the age of 18 require permission to 
marry from their parent or guardian or, if appropriate, a court order – as in England and 
Wales.35 
Interestingly, according to the explanatory notes of the Marriage Bill, which formed the 
basis of the 2003 Order, part of the fundamental rationale for reform was that it would bring 
‘the system of marriage preliminaries into the 21st century, by removing archaic concepts and 
by affording a greater freedom of choice in relation to getting married.’36 However, though 
subsequent reform under the 2003 Order may have given different sex couples more freedom 
of choice when getting married, same sex couples had no legal option to formalise their 
relationship at that time, and still do not have the freedom to marry. 
 
                                                 
32 Smyth, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 55, [30].  
33 Hansard, HC First Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, col 4 (16 December 2002). 
34 For which, see the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977: mutatis mutandis, the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 
2003 follows its structure fairly closely. See further M McLean, ‘Beyond belief: the law and practice of 
marriage formation in contemporary Scotland’ [2018] 30 CFLQ **. 
35 NI Direct Government Services, ‘Guidance on marriage procedures in Northern Ireland’, at 
<https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/guidance-marriage-procedures-northern-ireland> accessed 4 May 2018. 
36 Department of Finance and Personnel, n 18 above, para 7. 
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Same Sex Relationships in Northern Ireland 
Citizens of Northern Ireland are entitled to dual Irish and British citizenship, yet unlike Irish 
citizens in the Republic of Ireland and British citizens in the rest of the UK, same sex couples 
cannot legally marry in Northern Ireland. Instead, they must register as civil partners to have 
their relationships legally recognised in that jurisdiction. This section examines the context in 
which the civil partnership framework was introduced in Northern Ireland and the current 
debate over equal marriage. These matters are inextricably linked, as the context of civil 
partnership in Northern Ireland differs from the rest of the UK, and therefore an assessment of 
this context facilitates a richer understanding of why there is still resistance to equal marriage 
in Northern Ireland. Reflecting on the debates surrounding the introduction of a civil 
partnership framework in Northern Ireland also demonstrates how social attitudes have 
changed since 2003-2004. 
   
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 
Civil partnerships were introduced for the whole of the United Kingdom by the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004. The Act was passed by the UK Parliament and, at the time, Northern 
Ireland was under direct rule from Westminster after the collapse of the power-sharing 
Executive at Stormont.37 The dates for their registration in England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland were identical, with the respective commencement orders bringing the 
provisions of the Act into effect on 5 December 2005. In practical terms, this meant that civil 
partnership registrations under the standard procedure as set out in sections 8-17 of the Act 
became available in all three jurisdictions fifteen days later and the first civil partnership 
ceremonies in the UK took place in City Hall, Belfast, on 19 December 2005.38  
                                                 
37 Stormont is the location of the Northern Ireland Parliament. 
38 BBC News (2005), ‘“Gay weddings” first for Belfast’, 19 December 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4540226.stm> accessed 24 May 2018. 
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The introduction of the Act in Northern Ireland was not straightforward for, as Baroness 
Hale has noted, ‘adherence to traditional family values is more widespread in Northern Ireland 
than in the rest of the United Kingdom, as is religious belief’;39 but as Brian Sloan observed, 
had Northern Ireland not introduced a legal framework for the recognition of same sex 
relationships it would have ultimately been in breach of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,40 as seen in cases like Oliari and others v Italy.41  
The debate about civil partnership in Northern Ireland began in 2003, when Ministers 
in the Northern Ireland Office published a consultation paper on whether the Civil Partnership 
Bill should include provisions introducing civil partnerships in Northern Ireland alongside the 
rest of the UK. While 86 per cent of all respondents opposed this,42 60 per cent of organisational 
respondents supported its introduction.43 In Parliament, the legislation divided opinion between 
the two communities in Northern Ireland: of those Ulster MPs who voted on the Commons 
second reading of the Civil Partnership Bill – which was first introduced into the Lords – John 
Hume and Seamus Mallon, both of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, voted in favour 
while the Unionists voted against.44 
Considering the range of arguments surrounding the Bill, Sloan notes the conviction of 
some religious groups that same sex relationships were inherently wrong and undermined 
marriage and the model of the traditional family.45 Other religious groups did not necessarily 
                                                 
39 Re G [2008] UKHL, at [121], cited in Sloan, n 8 above. 
40 Sloan, n 8 above. 
41 Oliari and others v Italy [2015] ECHR, (2017) 65 EHRR 26 (App No 18766/11). 
42 Office of Law Reform, n 8 above, [6]. 
43 Ibid at [7]. 
44 Hansard, HC Deb vol 425, col 253 (12 October 2004). 
45 Sloan, n 8 above, 257. 
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hold such beliefs but feared that reform would impact on the freedom of religion46 of those 
opposed to civil partnerships.47  
However, the Government addressed religious objections by asserting that it had ‘no 
intention or desire to interfere with religious beliefs in any way’;48 instead, it highlighted the 
‘significant unfairness and inequality’ experienced by same sex couples with no means of 
having their relationship legally recognised.49 In reality, after the introduction of the Civil 
Partnership Act in Northern Ireland there was an increase in the number of marriages when 
one compares the figures for 2015 with those for 2005 – which, as Sloan suggests, undermines 
the arguments of those who claimed that civil partnerships would affect marriage rates and 
weaken the institution of marriage.50  
The legal consequences of civil partnerships do not differ, at least in any meaningful 
way, from those in the rest of the UK; and the High Court of Northern Ireland has held51 that 
the property consequences of civil partnership dissolution mirror those applicable to marriage 
in Northern Ireland.52 The social consequences of civil partnerships are more difficult to 
determine, but recent data show a significant shift in public attitudes since the introduction of 
civil partnerships was debated in 2003 and 2004. Indeed, Sloan has suggested that, while the 
                                                 
46 R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13(2) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157. The tension between 
recognition of same sex relationships and freedom of religion has increased as a result of the high-profile case of 
Lee v McArthur & Ors [2016] NICA 39: the appeal against that judgment was heard by the Supreme Court 
(sitting in Belfast) on 1-4 May 2018 and, at the time of writing, judgment was still awaited. 
47 See Sloan, n 8 above, 256 for a complete summary of the range of arguments from respondents opposed to 
reform. For instance, some respondents used the census data to argue that there was a relatively small number of 
same sex households; but the data was challenged by the Government, which argued there might be families 
recorded in the census which did not wish to disclose their sexual orientation for fear of homophobic attacks: 
see Office of Law Reform, Department of Finance and Personnel, Civil Partnership: A Legal Status for 
Committed Same sex Couples in Northern Ireland (Belfast 2003). This argument is supported by the gulf 
between the 288 households declared to consist of a same sex couple in the 2001 census and the 1,026 civil 
partnerships registered in Northern Ireland between 2005 and 2015 (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 
Agency, 2016), available at <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/publications/civil-partnerships-northern-ireland-2005-
2015> accessed 18 June 2018. 
48 Office of Law Reform, n 8 above, [15]. 
49 Ibid, 8. 
50 Sloan, n 8 above, 259. 
51 Stevenson v Stevenson [2008] NI Fam 8. 
52 For an overview the property consequences of divorce in Northern Ireland, see S Thompson, ‘Ancillary Relief 
in Northern Ireland: The Jurisprudence of the Noughties’ (2010) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 61 (4) 431-
437. 
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relationship between the ‘remarkable’ change in Northern Irish attitudes and the Civil 
Partnership Act cannot be factually proven, the Act still ‘cannot possibly be irrelevant to the 
greater tolerance now in evidence’. From this perspective, it would be a mistake to assume that 
the religious and social conservativism that influenced an 86 per cent opposition to civil 
partnership in 2003 still prevails; indeed, recent studies suggest that a majority of the public in 
Northern Ireland now favours same sex marriage.53 Nevertheless, though the pressure for 
change is increasing, the likelihood of the imminent introduction of same sex marriage is 
unclear. 
 
Same sex marriage 
The first and second civil partnerships in the UK were registered in Northern Ireland. However, 
while other same sex couples around the UK have since been given the right to convert their 
civil partnership to marriage pursuant to the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, those 
first couples to register as civil partners still cannot marry in Northern Ireland. Same sex 
couples who marry in England, Wales or Scotland are not legally recognised as spouses in 
Northern Ireland but are instead regarded in law as civil partners;54 and civil partners travelling 
abroad will not necessarily fulfil those visa requirements that apply to spousal relationships.55 
While there are few formal legal differences between marriage and civil partnership, the 
symbolic gulf between the two is significant. Indeed, as Sue Wilkinson and Celia Kitzinger 
                                                 
53 See Pink News, ‘Just 1 in 5 people oppose same sex marriage in Northern Ireland’: at 
<https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2018/04/09/just-1-in-5-oppose-equal-marriage-in-northern-ireland/> accessed 4 
May 2018 and Belfast Telegraph, ‘Northern Ireland says yes to same sex marriage, latest polling finds’: at 
<https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/northern-ireland-says-yes-to-samesex-marriage-
latest-polling-finds-35281876.html> accessed 4 May 2018. It should be noted that the reliability of these studies 
is unclear. 
54 Pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
55 Furthermore, debates over the practical purpose of civil partnership in the rest of the UK following the 
introduction of same sex marriage can only be theoretical so long as civil partnership remains the only option 
for formalised same sex relationships in Northern Ireland. 
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stated prior to their unsuccessful petition for a declaration that their marriage, contracted in 
Canada, was valid under English law:56 
 
Marriage is a lynchpin of social organization: its laws and customs interface with almost every 
sphere of social interaction. Its foundational role in defining structures of social institution and 
citizenship means that definitional authority over what ‘counts’ as marriage, and who is allowed 
access to it, has always been intensely political. Systematic exclusion of any group of people 
from the institution of marriage has been (and continues to be) a powerful way of oppressing 
that group in terms both of concrete rights and responsibilities and – more crucially still – in 
terms of the symbolic message that the group so discriminated against is unworthy of equality, 
and is less than ‘human’.57 
 
For many couples the formal equivalence of marriage and civil partnership is insufficient.58 
Therefore, it is argued, excluding gay and lesbian couples from the option of marriage in 
Northern Ireland is substantively discriminatory and raises issues of equality. 
The social landscape in Northern Ireland has arguably changed since the Civil 
Partnership Act was introduced and there appears to be considerable appetite for reform,59 
particularly after the introduction of same sex marriage in the Republic of Ireland, following 
the decision of the Convention on the Constitution on 14 April 2013 – by an overwhelming 
                                                 
56 Wilkinson v Kitzinger & Ors [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam). 
57 C Kitzinger and S Wilkinson, ‘The Re-Branding of Marriage: Why we got married instead of registering a 
civil partnership’ (2004) 14(1) Feminism & Psychology 127. 
58 As activist group ‘Love Equality’ states: ‘many people want to get married and see civil partnerships as 
something given less societal respect and understanding than marriage’, Sloan, n 8 above, 273, quoting ‘Love 
Equality, Frequently Asked Questions’, at <https://loveequalityni.org/faqs/> accessed 4 May 2018. 
59 There has also been a change in attitude from some Northern Irish political parties. SDLP and Sinn Féin have 
both brought motions forward in the Northern Ireland Assembly for marriage equality. Marriage equality is 
listed on both parties’ most recent manifestos as key policies (see 
<http://www.sdlp.ie/site/assets/files/43536/manifesto_2017_low_res.pdf> and 
<https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2017/MANIFESTO_ENGLISH.pdf> respectively). Sinn Féin in particular has 
pursued marriage equality in Northern Ireland since the Republic of Ireland’s referendum resulting in same sex 
marriage in 2015. One reason for this is that Sinn Féin seeks parity of legislation North and South of the border 
(although Sinn Féin is arguably more socially progressive than Northern Ireland’s Unionist parties in any case). 
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majority – to recommend a change in the law.60 In June 2013 the Convention reported formally 
that ‘the Constitution should contain an express acceptance of the right of persons of the same 
sex to marry each other’61 and the subsequent referendum in 2015 approved the proposal to 
amend the Constitution by a margin of almost two to one. And so same sex marriage became 
legal in the Republic of Ireland, while the North continued to debate the issue. 
On 1 October 2012, a motion calling on the Executive to introduce same sex marriage 
legislation was discussed by the Assembly – and was rejected.62 The motion was tabled by the 
Green Party and Sinn Féin, supported by the Alliance Party63 and the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party. The Democratic Unionist Party and most MLAs from the Ulster Unionist Party 
opposed it.64 The motion was defeated by 50 votes to 45. But, in accordance with the rules of 
the Assembly, the DUP had tabled a ‘petition of concern’ under section 42 of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998 – a mechanism designed to protect the interests of minorities – which meant 
that the motion would pass only if separate majorities of Nationalists and Unionists supported 
it.65 So even if it had achieved a majority of votes cast, the motion would still not have been 
carried because there was no way that a majority of Unionists (of whatever party allegiance) 
was going to vote for it. 
The subsequent referendum in the Republic of Ireland did not fail to have an impact on 
opinion in Northern Ireland; and on 29 April 2013 the Assembly returned to the 
                                                 
60 ‘Convention on the Constitution Votes in favour of Same Sex Marriage’ 14 April 2013: 
<https://www.constitution.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?mid=b4bee9f7-fda4-e211-a5a0-005056a32ee4> 
accessed 4 May 2018. See further K O’Sullivan and S Leahy, ‘Marriage in Ireland: Current Law and Practice’ 
[2018] 30 CFLQ **. 
61 Third Report of the Convention on the Constitution: Amending the Constitution to provide for same sex 
marriage, June 2013: <https://www.constitution.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?mid=c90ab08b-ece2-e211-a5a0-
005056a32ee4>. As a result, the Thirty-fourth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland was signed into law on 
29 August 2015 and same sex marriage was legalised by the Marriage Act 2015. 
62 Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report, Monday 1 October 2013 vol 77, no 7, 13-28, 40. 
63 Which describes itself on its website as ‘Northern Ireland’s cross-community party’: 
<https://allianceparty.org/page/join-alliance> accessed 10 June 2018.  
64 Ulster Unionist MLA Basil McCrea told the Assembly that he would probably be one of the few on the 
Unionist benches to speak in favour of the motion: NIA Official Report, vol 77 No 7, 19 (1 October 2013). 
65 Section 42(1) requires that ‘If 30 members petition the Assembly expressing their concern about a matter 
which is to be voted on by the Assembly, the vote on that matter shall require cross-community support’.  
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matter, debating the following motion in the name of three Sinn Féin MLAs – Caitríona Ruane, 
Bronwyn McGahan and Barry McElduff: ‘That this Assembly recognises the importance of 
the constitutional convention; notes the participation of parties from the Assembly; welcomes 
the 79 per cent majority vote at the Constitutional Convention in favour of marriage equality; 
and calls on the Executive to bring forward the necessary legislation to allow for same sex 
marriage’.66 The nub of their argument was that ‘what Churches do is a matter for Churches’ 
but that the state needed to treat everyone equally and that the ‘traditional’ family based on 
heterosexual marriage should not have any higher status in law or practice than any other form 
of family life. Law and social policy, in their view, should recognise the diversity of family life 
in Northern Ireland and respect the rights of all families, including those in which the partners 
were unmarried. 
David Ford MLA, at the time leader of the Alliance Party and Minister of Justice in the 
Northern Ireland Executive, proposed an amendment to leave out from ‘Assembly’ to the end 
of the question and add: ‘states its support for the extension of civil marriage provisions in 
Northern Ireland to same sex couples, provided that robust legislative measures permit faith 
groups to define, articulate and practise religious marriage as they determine; and calls for 
respectful dialogue on this issue between all members of society’. 
Unsurprisingly, both the amendment and the original motion were lost – the latter by 
an overall majority of 53 votes to 42. As on the previous occasion, the Nationalists, broadly 
speaking, voted in favour and the Unionists against – though there was a thoughtful speech 
from at least one UUP member in support of the Alliance amendment when Michael Copeland 
MLA reminded the Assembly of the disgraceful treatment meted out to Alan Turing on account 
of his homosexuality. Again, had the motion been carried on the raw numerical vote it would 
still not have passed because the DUP had tabled a petition of concern. 
                                                 
66 Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report, vol 84 no 5, 15-28, 42-46 (29 April 2013). 
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The Assembly returned to the matter again on 27 April 2015, when it debated a motion 
in the names of Caitríona Ruane and others, as follows: 
That this Assembly welcomes the marriage equality referendum in the south of Ireland; notes that a 
growing number of parliaments across the world have embraced, and legislated for, marriage 
equality; respects the rights of the religious institutions to define, observe and practise marriage 
within their beliefs; and calls on the Executive to legislate for marriage equality for same sex couples 
so that all citizens will have the same legal entitlement to the protections, responsibilities, rights, 
obligations and benefits afforded by the legal institution of marriage. 
The motion was defeated by 49 votes to 47. Sinn Féin, the SDLP and five Alliance MLAs 
supported the motion, while the DUP opposed it. The UUP allowed its members a free vote on 
the issue but of 53 Unionist MLAs only four voted in favour: Danny Kinahan, John 
McCallister, Basil McCrea and Claire Sugden. As on previous occasions, a petition of concern 
had been tabled in advance of the vote.67 
Though not formally suspended, the Assembly went into abeyance at the beginning of 
2017 following the resignation of the late Martin McGuinness MLA as Deputy First Minister 
over a row between Sinn Féin and the DUP about a controversial green energy scheme. At the 
time of writing, there seemed little prospect of a new Executive being established and, in any 
event, the issue of the absence of same sex marriage in Northern Ireland seemed likely to 
remain unresolved by the Northern Ireland Executive for the foreseeable future. 
However, the matter has not rested there. In X,68 the applicant, a gay man living in 
Northern Ireland, married his husband in a religious ceremony in London in 2014 under the 
provisions of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. According to media reports, the 
couple, who are liberal Christians, chose not to have a civil partnership ceremony in Northern 
                                                 
67 Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report, vol 104 no 3, 10-22, 40-42 (27 April 2015).  
68 X, Re [2017] NI Fam 12. 
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Ireland because it had no religious significance.69 X sought a declaration that his English 
marriage was a valid and subsisting marriage under the law of Northern Ireland pursuant to 
Article 31 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (SI 
1989/677) and that the failure to recognise it as a valid and subsisting marriage when domiciled 
in Northern Ireland contravened his Convention rights – ‘notwithstanding the provisions of 
Schedule 2 and the clear intentions of the Westminster Parliament not to legislate for same sex 
marriage in Northern Ireland’.70  
O’Hara J accepted that Article 31 of the Order gave him jurisdiction to hear X’s 
petition;71 however, he dismissed the petition on the grounds that the Strasbourg case law was 
‘entirely against X’, there was no right under Convention law to recognition of same sex 
marriage and it was an issue on which states parties to the ECHR had a wide margin of 
appreciation – adding that the House of Lords and the Supreme Court had repeatedly made the 
point that national courts should not without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the 
Strasbourg case law.72  On that basis, he also rejected a challenge under Article 9 ECHR.73 
Furthermore, in a brief judgment in Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review,74 O’Hara J 
dismissed a challenge to Article 6 of the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 by two same 
sex couples who had entered into civil partnerships in 2005.75 This case involved the first two 
couples (Grainne Close and Shannon Sickles, and Chris and Henry Flanagan-Kane) to register 
their civil partnerships following the introduction of the 2004 Act. The applicants contended 
that the effect of the Convention, as incorporated into the law of the United Kingdom by the 
                                                 
69 Laura Abernethy, ‘Gay Christian couple in battle to overturn same sex marriage ban’, Belfast Telegraph (20 
August 2015). 
70 X [2017] NI Fam 12, [10]. 
71 Ibid, [15]. 
72 Ibid, [28]. 
73 Ibid, [23].  
74 Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 79. 
75 In its initial form, the judicial review had challenged the use of the petition of concern in the Assembly; 
however, that issue was not pursued: Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 79, [3]. 
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Human Rights Act 1998, was that the denial of same sex marriage in Northern Ireland was 
unlawful.76 
O’Hara J noted that the Strasbourg Court had not imposed an obligation on states parties 
to introduce same sex marriage; though the European Court of Human Rights required some 
form of legal recognition of same sex relationships, that recognition already existed in Northern 
Ireland in the form of the civil partnership.77 In Schalk and Kopf v Austria,78 the ECtHR had 
held that a provision of the Austrian Civil Code under which marriage had to be between 
persons of the opposite sex was not contrary to Article 12 ECHR (right to marry and found a 
family) and that changes in attitudes and social policy did not lead to a conclusion that a ‘living 
instrument’ interpretation of the Convention was justified in that case or would lead to a 
conclusion that Article 12 embraced same sex marriage – on which there was no European 
consensus.79 The Grand Chamber had considered the matter again in the context of Article 12 
in Hämäläinen v Finland80 and had again concluded that Article 12 did not oblige states parties 
to introduce same sex marriage81 – a judgment confirmed in Oliari v Italy.82 In both Schalk and 
Kopf and Hämäläinen the ECtHR had also rejected the proposition that the absence of same 
sex marriage violated Article 8 (respect for private and family life).83 
If there was a trend, it was undoubtedly towards recognition of same sex marriage in 
more and more countries but ‘there is no sign whatever of the Strasbourg Court moving in that 
direction. It has had three opportunities to consider the issue during this decade and has turned 
its face firmly against it’.84 Thus O’Hara J concluded that if equality in marriage was to be 
                                                 
76 Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 79, [7]. 
77 Ibid, [8]. 
78 Schalk and Kopf v Austria [2010] ECHR 995; (2011) 53 EHRR 20 (App No 30141/04). 
79 Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 79, [9]. 
80 Hämäläinen v Finland [2014] ECHR 787 (App No 37359/09). 
81 Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 79, [10]. 
82 Oliari and others v Italy [2015] ECHR 716, [11]. 
83 Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 79 at [12]. 
84 Ibid at [15]. Subsequent to the judgment in Close, Strasbourg had a fourth opportunity to consider the issue. 
In Orlandi and others v Italy [2017] ECHR 1153 (App Nos 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 and 60088/12), the 
majority noted that ‘The Court has already held, in respect of various domestic legislations, that civil unions 
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achieved for same sex couples, ‘it will have to be achieved through the Assembly. I hope that 
when the Assembly is next asked to consider the issue, those who have the responsibility of 
voting will read the evidence in this case and in Re X in order to understand more completely 
the issue before them’.85 
The petitioners in Close and in X appealed. At the time of writing, the Northern Ireland 
Court of Appeal had heard both appeals, but judgments were still awaited.86 
Nevertheless, Executive stalling on same sex marriage in Northern Ireland has not 
meant that the issue has been shelved. In the spring of 2018, twin bills were introduced in each 
House of the Westminster Parliament, both entitled the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
(Northern Ireland) Bill; if enacted, they would introduce same sex marriage in Northern 
Ireland, provide for the legal recognition of same sex marriages of armed forces personnel 
overseas and other such marriages solemnized outside Northern Ireland and provide for the 
conversion of civil partnerships to marriages. The Bills would also require the Secretary of 
State to initiate a review of civil partnerships and would confer rights to pensions and social 
security contributions on same sex married couples and civil partners. Finally, they would 
make provision in relation to gender change by spouses and civil partners. In short, as a 
representative of the activist group ‘Love Equality’ put it, these Bills are ‘a powerful 
demonstration of cross-party, cross-parliamentary support for equal marriage in Northern 
Ireland’.87 
The chances of their becoming law, however, are slight because they do not have 
Government support. When asked by Ged Killen whether she would support the Bill before 
                                                 
provide an opportunity to obtain a legal status equal or similar to marriage in many respects … The Court 
considers that, in principle, such a system would prima facie suffice to satisfy Convention standards’ [194]. 
85 Close & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 79, [17]. 
86 A Erwin, ‘Judgment reserved on Northern Ireland couple's same sex marriage legal challenge’, Belfast 
Telegraph (16 March 2018). 
87 S McGonagle, ‘Two bills to legalise same sex marriage in Northern Ireland before both houses’, Irish News 
(27 March 2018) at <https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2018/03/27/news/parallel-bills-on-
same sex-marriage-in-northern-ireland-to-enter-house-of-commons-and-house-of-lords-1288193/> accessed 4 
May 2018. 
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the Commons during Prime Minister’s Questions, Theresa May said that ‘this is a devolved 
matter that will be dealt with, and we hope that there will be a Northern Ireland Executive in 
place soon that will be able to address these issues’.88 Moreover, it should be remembered that 
the Conservative Government does not have an overall Commons majority and relies on a 
‘Confidence and Supply’ agreement with the DUP89 – which, as we have seen, is bitterly 
opposed to any such development.  
 
Humanist weddings 
Northern Ireland’s cultural proximity with the Republic of Ireland has not only highlighted 
Northern Ireland’s absence of same sex marriage: it has also made more apparent the absence 
of any facility for ‘belief’ weddings in Northern Ireland, as opposed to purely civil weddings. 
Couples can have a humanist wedding south but not north of the border. This has caused some 
controversy and has been challenged in the Northern Ireland courts in the case of Smyth, Re 
Judicial Review.90 This section will explore the importance of this case, which has changed 
marriage law in Northern Ireland (and could possibly influence change in England and Wales). 
In Smyth, Laura Smyth and her fiancé Eunan O’Kane, both humanists, wished to marry 
in a legally-recognised humanist wedding ceremony on 22 June 2017.91 Ms Smyth applied to 
the General Register Office (GRO) for temporary authorisation for a British Humanist 
Association92 wedding celebrant, Ms Isobel Russo, to perform the marriage under Article 14 
of the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 but was refused.93 She challenged both the 
                                                 
88 Hansard, HC Deb vol 638 col 755 (28 March 2018). 
89 For the text of the agreement, see  <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conservative-and-dup-
agreement-and-uk-government-financial-support-for-northern-ireland/agreement-between-the-conservative-and-
unionist-party-and-the-democratic-unionist-party-on-support-for-the-government-in-parliament> accessed 11 
June 2018. 
90 Smyth, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 55. 
91 Ibid at [1-3]. 
92 Which subsequently changed its name to Humanists UK. 
93 Smyth, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 55, [5-7]. 
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decision itself and the lawfulness of the legislation which, she argued, were incompatible with 
her Convention rights.94 
Ms Smyth and her fiancé wanted ‘an explicitly humanist marriage ceremony – not a 
civil ceremony with attenuated humanist “bits”’95 – involving a clear public affirmation before 
their family and friends of their humanist values as individuals and as a couple. Legal validity 
was also important to them because it signified that the state recognised their values as 
legitimate and worthy of legal recognition equal to the diverse religious beliefs that were 
afforded the same legal privilege. ‘We only have this one life and so the decision to share with 
one other person is all the more significant for a humanist’, said Ms Smyth.96  
The crux of the issue was that the GRO was not prepared to interpret ‘religious 
marriage’ as encompassing ‘belief marriage’: humanism is undoubtedly a belief but, equally, 
it is not a religion. And the 2003 Order only provides for ‘religious marriages’97 and civil 
marriages’: it does not ostensibly provide for ‘belief’ marriages. But Ms Smyth argued that a 
more expansive interpretation of the 2003 Order was possible. ‘Religious marriage’, she 
argued, could – and should – be read to include the concept of ‘belief marriage’. This broader 
approach would encompass a humanist marriage performed by a BHA-accredited celebrant, 
which, she claimed, should be afforded equal protection.98  
If the 2003 Order could not be interpreted in this way, Ms Smyth argued that those 
provisions of the 2003 Order which only permitted the authorisation of religious marriage99 
contravened Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) ECHR and/or Article 14 
                                                 
94 Ibid, [13]. 
95 Ibid, [56]. 
96 Ibid, [56]. 
97 And under Article 14, the Registrar General may grant a member of a religious body a temporary 
authorisation to solemnize a religious marriage: ibid, [24]. 
98 Smyth, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 55, [33]. 
99 On behalf of a religious body by the General Register Office. 
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(prohibition of discrimination)100 because they excluded the possibility of granting temporary 
authorisation (and thereby legal recognition) for a humanist marriage ceremony.101 
The respondents argued that the Order did not include a power to grant a temporary 
authorisation to a humanist celebrant because the British Humanist Association was not a 
religious body, nor was the state obliged to facilitate every manifestation of religion or belief.102 
Furthermore, there was no interference with Ms Smyth’s Article 9 and/or 14 rights – and if 
there was any interference, it was justified in law.103 The Attorney General noted that Ms Smyth 
had not framed her challenge under Article 12 ECHR (right to marry and found a family) and 
argued that Article 9 was not engaged because Ms Smyth’s desire to have her humanist 
ceremony recognised as legally binding did not come within the ambit of a ‘manifestation’ of 
her humanist belief within the meaning of Article 9(1). A requirement to provide legal 
recognition for humanist marriage would be contrary to ‘the natural flow of existing Strasbourg 
case law’.104 
Colton J disagreed. He concluded that Ms Smyth’s beliefs easily met the test of ‘a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ in Eweida and Others v United 
Kingdom105 and that Article 9 was engaged.106 He reasoned that courts in England and Wales 
had looked at the issue of manifestation and had stated that, as a minimum, a belief had to be 
consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity, relate to matters that were more 
than merely trivial and possess an adequate degree of seriousness and importance. The freedom 
to hold a belief was an absolute right, whereas the right to manifest a belief was a qualified 
                                                 
100 Smyth, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 55, [34]. 
101 Further, the Department of Finance had acted unlawfully in failing to introduce regulations to correct that 
illegality and discharge its statutory obligation under s 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998: Smyth, Re Judicial 
Review [2017] NIQB 55, [35]. 
102 Ibid, [36]. 
103 Ibid, [38]. 
104 Ibid, [39]. 
105 Eweida and others v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37, (2013) 57 EHRR 8 (App Nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 
51671/10 and 36516/10) [81]. 
106 Smyth, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 55, [48]. 
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right. In order to count as a ‘manifestation’ within the meaning of Article 9, the act in question 
had to be intimately linked to the religion or belief. There had to be a sufficiently close and 
direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief – which had to be determined on the 
facts of each case.107 
Colton J noted that the essence of Ms Smyth’s case was based on the different treatment 
between religious bodies and humanists despite the fact that both groups had shared beliefs. 
The basis of her claim was that the state had chosen to empower religious bodies to perform 
legally valid marriages but had refused to extend that privilege to humanists. More importantly, 
the respondents had missed her fundamental point: she did not want a civil marriage but, rather, 
a marriage solemnized by a humanist celebrant – which was different and distinct from a civil 
marriage. Ms Smyth did not understand her marriage as a ‘purely legal’ construct. It was, as 
she saw it, a manifestation of her beliefs.108 
As a result, the court held that Ms Smyth’s desire for a humanist officiant at her 
wedding was a manifestation of her humanist beliefs that engaged Article 9109 and that there 
had been an interference with her Article 9 rights.110 Her rights under Articles 9 and 14 had 
been breached because, in Colton J’s view, to protect freedom of religion the law ‘must 
recognise that all religions and beliefs should be treated equally’.111 He had concluded that 
humanism met the test of a belief body, and the state’s decision to authorise the solemnization 
of religious marriage ceremonies in recognition of those bodies’ beliefs therefore meant that it 
also had to ‘provide equal recognition to individuals who hold humanists’ beliefs’.112 
Colton J then considered whether the breach or difference in treatment was capable of 
objective justification. The respondents had argued that a successful application would create 
                                                 
107 Ibid, [55]. 
108 Ibid, [68]. 
109 Ibid, [69]. 
110 Ibid, [76]. 
111 Ibid, [94]. 
112 Ibid, [96]. 
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‘huge difficulties for the regulation of marriage’113 and that there was ‘a significant public 
interest in closely controlling (and limiting) those who are permitted to officiate’ because 
permitting any non-religious group to conduct weddings ‘could dilute the dignity and status of 
marriage in Northern Ireland’.114 In Colton J’s view, however, the second argument fell ‘into 
the very trap that Articles 9 and 14 are designed to avoid. It does not chime with the State’s 
obligation to respect all religions and beliefs’.115 Moreover, the ‘flood gate argument’ was not 
borne out by the evidence116 because Ms Smyth’s was the only application that had been 
received by a non-religious body.117 Moreover, if granted temporary authorisation the 
application would still be subject to the series of checks and balances applied by the 2003 Order 
all marriages118 and any applicant would still have to  satisfy the test of a ‘belief’ – not all of 
which would attract the protections of Article 9; moreover, the experience in Scotland between 
2005 and 2015 suggested that registration of humanist officiants had not given rise to 
‘administrative chaos or difficulty’.119 There was a significant public interest in controlling and 
regulating marriage, but that could be achieved without discriminating against those who 
wished to manifest humanist beliefs.120 He concluded that there was no objective basis for the 
justification raised by the respondents121 and that there had therefore been an unlawful 
interference with Ms Smyth’s Convention rights with no objective justification in law.122 
As to the question of remedy, he decided to echo the approach taken in Scotland by 
reading the words ‘or belief’ into Articles 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the 2003 Order in each reference 
to ‘religious marriage’ so that the Order would read ‘religious or belief marriage’.123 That 
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interpretation quashed the decision of the GRO and meant that Ms Smyth could have a legally 
valid and binding humanist wedding. However, the relief granted constituted temporary 
authorisation only, because it authorised Ms Smyth’s wedding specifically; crucially, it did not 
change the legal status of humanist weddings in Northern Ireland generally. Though Ms Smyth 
might complain that temporary authorisation still constituted discrimination, Colton 
J considered it appropriate relief in the circumstances for three reasons. First, Ms Smyth had 
only sought temporary authorisation. Secondly, his decision would provide the GRO with an 
opportunity to monitor and assess the extent to which belief bodies sought to avail of the 
opportunity for temporary authorisation. Thirdly, there would be more control over the process, 
which would enable the Registrar General to guard against the potential difficulties that, it had 
been suggested, might arise in the event that belief bodies were permitted to avail of the 
entitlements provided in respect of religious marriages.124 The Registrar General could impose 
any conditions deemed necessary for any temporary authorisations – and all the other 
protections in the 2003 Order remained in place.125 He declined to make a declaration of 
incompatibility in respect of the 2003 Order and did not hold that the Department of Finance 
had failed to discharge its statutory obligations pursuant to section 75 of the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998.126 However, he strongly advised reform of the 2003 Order to ensure the breaches 
that he had identified in this case would be remedied.127 It should be emphasised that Colton J 
granted specific relief related to the specific set of circumstances before him – and so the more 
general issue of humanist weddings in Northern Ireland remained unresolved. The judgment 
in Smyth was appealed and in June 2017 the Court of Appeal granted interim authority for the 
wedding to go ahead. 
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On 28 June 2018, the Court of Appeal handed down its substantive judgment.128 The 
Attorney General noted that the challenge had been framed in terms of Article 9 and Article 14 
ECHR, whereas the lex specialis that deals with marriage was Article 12, which expressly 
provided for regulation of marriage by national law. He argued that nothing in Article 12 or 
national law required legal recognition of humanist marriage ceremonies and that the 
Convention had to be read as a whole: Articles 9 and 14 could not be used to establish rights 
related to marriage that had not been provided for in Article 12.129 Moreover, the British 
Humanist Association did not exercise a marriage ministry; and Colton J had therefore been 
wrong to rely on its objectives for the purpose of establishing a nexus between the respondent’s 
wish to have a particular form of marriage recognised by law and her underlying beliefs. Colton 
J ought to have enquired into what was, from the respondent's perspective, missing from a civil 
ceremony and whether what was missing had a sufficiently close nexus with her underlying 
belief.130 Further, a humanist celebrant was not in a relevantly comparable situation to those 
who could be granted temporary authorisation to solemnise marriages pursuant to Article 14 
of the 2003 Order (Temporary authorisation to solemnise religious marriage) because such an 
authorisation could only be issued to a member of a religious body and, in his contention, 
humanists did not constitute such a body.131 Moreover, refusing temporary authorisation had 
been justified by the need to protect the dignity of marriage by preventing its commercialisation 
because the licensing of humanist celebrants merely provided a commercial platform for 
certain individuals to earn money.132 Finally, he argued that the finding that Articles 9 and 14 
ECHR required the state to provide legal recognition for humanist marriage went against the 
natural flow of existing Strasbourg case law.133 
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Perhaps paradoxically, though the Court of Appeal accepted that the statutory 
prohibition of a humanist celebrant as the person solemnising the respondent’s marriage would 
have constituted discrimination pursuant to Articles 9 and 14 ECHR, it considered that Article 
31 of the 2003 Order provided a basis for avoiding such discrimination by enabling the 
appointment of a humanist celebrant without the need for it to be read and given effect in a way 
that was compatible with the Convention rights pursuant to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 
1998. The fact that the person solemnising the marriage would be appointed pursuant to Article 
31 of the 2003 Order (Registrars and other staff) rather than pursuant to Article 14 did not, in 
the Court’s view, give rise to any difference of treatment.134 
Though it had never been contemplated that Article 31(3) might be used in order to 
avoid discriminatory treatment in respect of the background of a marriage celebrant, where 
such discriminatory treatment arose it was the responsibility of the Registrar General to act in 
a way which avoided that discrimination and, if satisfied that a couple wanted a humanist 
marriage or civil partnership ceremony in order to express their humanist beliefs, ‘he should 
accommodate that request if content that the proposed celebrant will carry out the 
solemnisation of the marriage according to law’.135 Nor did the Court accept that the 
requirement that a civil ceremony had to be secular in nature would debar readings supporting 
or promoting humanist beliefs: ‘The prohibitions in Article 19 should be narrowly construed 
and ought not to interfere in any way with non-religious material’.136   
Accordingly, it allowed the Attorney’s appeal, quashed the mandatory Order made by 
Colton J and set aside his declaration – but otherwise agreed with ‘his carefully reasoned 
judgment’.137 
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One could argue that the Court of Appeal has missed an opportunity to make a 
declaration of incompatibility and trigger comprehensive reform of the legal status of humanist 
(or belief) weddings. After all, following Smyth, humanist weddings are only deemed legal in 
Northern Ireland by what might be described as a loophole in the 2003 Order. 
From a different perspective, however, Colton J’s judgment in Smyth has proved to be 
an important turning-point in Northern Ireland marriage law. It has created a precedent for 
couples to have legally valid humanist weddings – which the Court of Appeal has upheld. 
Indeed, it is significant that while the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the Attorney 
General, it appeared to reject his assertion that temporary authorisation was inappropriate 
because  humanist belief was not comparable to religious belief.138 That in itself could support 
future challenges to the law in England and Wales on the basis of discrimination, where such 
temporary authorisation is not available to couples. With humanist weddings now legally 
recognised in Scotland, Ireland and Northern Ireland, England and Wales are the outliers in 
this regard. As a result, it will be interesting to see whether the outcome of Smyth could increase 
pressure for reform and influence the future of marriage law in England and Wales. . 
 
Conclusion 
What this brief discussion of marriage law in Northern Ireland suggests – if nothing else – is 
that Northern Irish society is still grappling with issues that have been largely settled in 
                                                 
138 Ibid, [25 & 26]. 
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Scotland and Ireland – though the issue of humanist wedding ceremonies remains unresolved 
in England and Wales as well as in Northern Ireland.139  
The outstanding issue of same sex marriage is arguably the most glaring difference 
between marriage law in Northern Ireland and in the rest of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, 
but, unfortunately, it may not be resolved any time soon. When the issue was raised in the 
House of Commons the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Karen Bradley, was firmly of 
the view that reforming the law was a matter for the Northern Ireland Assembly: ‘Equal 
marriage is clearly a devolved issue and quite rightly should be legislated for in Stormont. That 
is the right place for this legislation to be enacted, and I look forward to a devolved Government 
being in place that can do that’.140 
  Whether the Assembly will return to the matter depends on the re-establishment of the 
Northern Ireland Executive. However, in the event that the Assembly does reconvene and same 
sex marriage is debated, it will no longer be possible for the members of the DUP to table a 
petition of concern without external support – most likely, from other Unionists. Under section 
42 of the 1998 Act and Standing Order No 28, a valid petition requires the signatures of 30 
Assembly members. Prior to the election in March 2017 the DUP had 38 seats: it now has 28, 
one of whom, Robin Newton MLA, is Speaker of the Assembly.141  
                                                 
139 As the Law Commission points out in Getting Married: A Scoping Paper (2015) para 1.5, under the current 
law in England and Wales it is not possible for a non-religious belief organisation such as Humanists UK to 
conduct any form of legally binding ceremony of marriage. S 14 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2103 
instructed the Secretary of State to arrange for a review as to whether an order should be made permitting 
marriages to be solemnized according to the usages of belief organisations on the authority of a superintendent 
registrar’s certificates and, if so, what provisions should be included in the order. There was a positive response 
to the consultation, but the Government decided in December 2014 to ask the Law Commission to conduct a 
general review of the law governing how and where people can marry in England and Wales – hence the 
scoping paper. At the time of writing the Ministry of Justice had kicked the issue into the long grass: see the 
decision letter dated 11 September 2017 from the Minister of State for Justice: Ministry of Justice, Response 
from Government on Marriage, at <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2017/10/Response-from-Govenment-on-Marriage.pdf> accessed 4 May 2018. 
140 Hansard, HC Deb vol 635 col 1479 (7 February 2018). 
141 As at Westminster, by convention the Speaker does not ‘become involved in party politics, nor does he or 
she comment on Northern Ireland political matters or on issues of Government policy’: G McGrath, The Role of 
the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly (London, Global Partners Governance, 2016), 2, available at 
<http://www.gpgovernance.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ENG-Role-of-the-Speaker-NI.pdf > accessed 10 
June 2018. 
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  When the Northern Ireland Executive (or whatever may replace it) is eventually in place 
once again, our suspicion is that it will no longer be able to ignore the strength of public support 
for same sex marriage. Northern Ireland has traditionally been rather more socially 
conservative than England and Wales, or even the Republic; for example, homosexual acts 
between consenting male adults aged 21 or above in private, decriminalised in England and 
Wales by the Sexual Offences Act 1967, were not decriminalised in Northern Ireland until 
1982.142  But, as we have suggested, there are signs that such social conservativism is waning 
and that attitudes now are very different from when civil partnership was debated in 2003-
2004, for three reasons. 
  The first is the hard-fought campaign by LGBTQ activists for equal rights. The second 
is that, though cases such as Close and X and legislative proposals such as those currently 
before the Commons and the Lords might not lead directly to reform, they serve to emphasise 
the inequity of the current law and create pressure for change. The third, and perhaps the most 
important, is that in comparison with the Republic, which introduced same sex marriage on 16 
November 2015143 and on 25 May 2018 voted by a two to one majority to repeal the 
constitutional bar on abortion, the law in Northern Ireland relating to issues of sexuality looks 
increasingly as if it is stuck in a 1950s time-warp. 
  The recent decision by the Supreme Court on the compatibility of abortion law in 
Northern Ireland with Articles 3 and 8 ECHR144 highlights both the dissonance between the 
law on matters of sexuality in Northern Ireland and Great Britain and the difficulty of change. 
In that case, a majority held that the current law was incompatible with the right to respect for 
                                                 
142 By the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 SI 19821536. The Order was made by the 
Westminster Parliament as a result of the judgment in Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149 (App 
No 7525/76), which held by fifteen votes to four that Northern Ireland’s criminalisation of homosexual acts 
between consenting male adults violated Article 8 ECHR (respect for private and family life). Subsequently, as 
a result of the judgment in Norris v Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186 (App No 10581/83), male homosexual acts 
between persons aged 17 or over were decriminalised in Ireland by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 
1993. 
143 By the Marriage Act 2015. 
144 Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland: Abortion) [2018] UKSC 27. 
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private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR insofar as it prohibits abortion in cases 
of rape, incest and fatal foetal abnormality.145 However, a majority also held that the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission did not have standing to bring the proceedings and, 
accordingly, that the Court did not have jurisdiction to make a declaration of incompatibility 
to reflect the majority view on the compatibility issues.146 In such circumstances, it would not 
be at all surprising if women (and men) in Northern Ireland were to look to recent developments 
in the Republic – traditionally, a much more socially-conservative society – and start asking 
‘If them, why not us?’ 
   So, to conclude, even if the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal does not rule in favour 
of the applicants in Close and X and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) (Northern Ireland) Bills 
are not enacted, the activists behind them147 will be an important part of the historic moment 
when, one day, same sex marriage is introduced in Northern Ireland. Rosemary Auchmuty 
argues that the ‘rhetoric of progress’148 often ignores the work of activists and pressure groups, 
and so when exploring marriage and civil partnership law in Northern Ireland, we would want 
to acknowledge their crucial role in its history. 
  The issue of same sex marriage apart, however, we would suggest that the current 
marriage law in Northern Ireland is considerably more fit for purpose than the law in England 
and Wales, based as the latter is on a statute that is now almost seventy years old and which 
was merely consolidation and minor amendment rather than new law even when it was passed. 
It is difficult to see, for example, in what circumstances the mistake that resulted in the 
proceedings in MA v JA149 could occur in Northern Ireland because, as we have seen, the law 
                                                 
145 Ibid, [2]. 
146 Ibid, [3]. 
147 For instance, the petitioners in X are supported by an activist group, The Rainbow Project, and the applicants 
in Close have used their own stories to raise consciousness about how the law unfairly affects them. 
148 R Auchmuty, ‘Legal History’ in R Auchmuty (ed.) Great Debates in Gender and Law (Palgrave 2018). 
149 MA v JA [2012] EWHC 2219 (Fam), in which a couple who had been married in an Islamic ceremony 
subsequently found that – unknown to them – the mosque had failed fully to comply with the registration 
requirements of the Marriage Act 1949 and were therefore obliged to seek a declaration that they had, in fact, 
contracted a valid marriage under English law. 
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authorises celebrants rather than registering buildings. As the Law Commissioner with 
responsibility for family law, Nick Hopkins, pointed out in his response to the Minister’s 
decision not to proceed with the Commission’s proposed project on marriage law in England 
and Wales, ‘Judging by what we have been told during consultation for our 13th Programme, 
the pressure for change in relation to marriage law – or at least for a comprehensive review of 
the area – is unlikely to diminish’.150  
  Northern Ireland is uniquely placed to show how that change could take effect. As we 
hope this article has shown, two of the areas identified for reform by the Law Commission151 
– marriage registration and belief/humanist weddings – are matters that have been reformed in 
Northern Ireland. Given that Northern Irish marriage law is based on licensing celebrants rather 
than venues, there is no simple read-across to England and Wales; nevertheless, if legislators 
at Westminster wish to know how to change these matters in a system of family law that is in 
other respects similar to their own, they should look very carefully at the developing landscape 
of Northern Irish marriage law. 
 
                                                 
150 N Hopkins, ‘Letter from Professor Nicholas Hopkins, Law Commissioner for Property, Family and Trust 
Law to Rt hon Dominic Raab MP, Minister of State at the Ministry of Justice, 26 October 2017’, at <https://s3-
eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/12/Letter-to-Dominic-Raab-
MP-Response-to-protocol-support-rejection-26.10.2017.pdf> accessed 4 May 2018. 
151 Law Commission, Getting Married: A Scoping Paper (2015). 
